Summay.-The authors propose that a multimodal classical conditioning model be considered when clinicians or clinical researchers study the etiology of fears and anxieties learned by human beings. They argue that fears can be built through the combined effects of direct, observed, and verbally presented classical conditioning trials. Multimodal classical conditioning is offered as an alternative to the three pathways to fear argument prominent in the human fear literature. In contrast to the three pathways position, the authors present theoretical arguments for why "learning by observation" and "learning through the receipt of verbal information" should be considered classical conditioning through observational and verbal modes. The paper includes a demonstration of how data, commonly collected in research on the three pathways to fear, would be studied differently using a multimodal classical conditioning perspective. Finally, the authors discuss implications for assessment, treatment, and prevention of learned fears in humans.
Problematic fear and anxiety reactions capture considerable clinical attention as evidenced by the numerous specific anxiety disorders in DSM-IV-R (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) . Clinicians must continually be interested in questions regarding the genesis of these disorders, as understanding how these problematic responses originate may suggest more effective treatment and, as clinicians broaden their attention to fostering resilience, effective prevention.
The question of how fear and anxiety reactions develop has been tackled on numerous fronts. Ultimately, psychology most likely will understand how a fear or anxiety reaction is shaped by a variety of influences. To date, investigations have proceeded from within biological, cognitive, or experience-based perspectives. Theoretical and empirical investigations on the biological and cognitive fronts have produced several models. They include analyses of how fear and anxiety might be neurologically mapped (Gray & McNaughton, 1996) , how some fears might be inborn, e.g., innate fears, as discussed by Menzies and Clarke (1995) , and Poulton and Menzies (2002) and prepared fears, as discussed by Seligman (1971) and McNally (1987) , and how attributional biases may affect fear acquisition (Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & Brown, 1995) . ' Address correspondence to Judith A. Dygdon, Ph.D., School of Psychology, Roosevelt University, 430 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, IL 60605 or e-mail (jdygdon@roosevelt.edu).
Within clinical psychology, an experience-based perspective may well have generated the most work on understanding the development of fear and anxiety reactions. The experience-based perspective views fear and anxiety development as resting on life events involving the person, object, or situation that is now feared. When fear and anxiety are studied from an experience-based perspective, the focus, most often, is on acquired or learned responses; that is, fear and anxiety responses that were not present at birth but developed later.
From a clinical perspective, it is compelling to look at learned fear responses and anxiety responses as distinctly different. Certainly, there are differences between the experience of fear and the experience of anxiety, and diagnostically, different labels may be useful. However, the fact that two emotional states may feel different does not guarantee that the learned versions develop through completely independent paths. Many (cf. Grillon, 2002) suggest that learned fear and learned anxiety are related responses. The states have in common the sense that a stimulus or a situation is aversive and that steps should be taken to remove the stimulus or change the situation. The present authors concur that the states are related and that it is reasonable to evaluate the appropriateness of a given acquisition path for both. The issues raised in this paper pertain equally to cases of learned fear and learned anxiety. To simplify exposition the term fear refers to both.
In early attempts to conceptualize human fear from a learning perspective, clinicians appealed to classical conditioning (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950) . In many clients, fear appears to be a "reflexive" reaction to a stimulus that is, in reality, harmless. Because classical conditioning (synonymously known as respondent or Pavlovian conditioning) explains how new responses are established to stimuli that do not naturally, i.e., without training, elicit them, the appeal of this model to explain learned human fear was logical. Classical conditioning argues that a conditioned response (CR) develops through pairings of a neutral stimulus (also called a conditional stimulus, conditioned stimulus, or CS), with an unconditioned stimulus (UCS) that naturally elicits an unconditioned response (UCR). Many of the fears that clinicians treat appear consistent with classical conditioning: Fears are elicited, like CRs, by stimuli that should be perceived as harmless or neutral, like CSs. Adding strength to the conceptualization of fears as conditioned responses was the fact that the mechanisms underlying many of the treatment strategies successful with fear could be understood as classical conditioning extinction or counterconditioning (cf. Masters, Burish, Hollon, & k m m , 1987) .
Over the years, however, clinicians have raised problems with a classical conditioning-based explanation for fears (Rachman , 1977 (Rachman , , 1990 Marks, 1979) . Rachman succinctly summarized the concerns clinicians still have about conditioning and fear. H e stated that conditioning cannot account for "fears that arise without any contact between the fear stimulus and the aversive event" (2002, p. 124) . In addition, Rachman (2002) stated that the clinical histories of many people who do not appear to be afraid of a stimulus show pairings of the stimulus with a traumatic event. Rachman (2002) argued that these facts indicate that classical conditioning is insufficient to account for the learning of fear in humans. This claim springs from two errors. First, clinicians, like Rachman, are using a limited definition of conditioning. That is, the only events they acknowledge as classical conditioning are direct pairings of a neutral stimulus (CS) and a traumatic event (UCS). Classical conditioning would label such pairings as examples of first-order conditioning, just one of several conditioned response-augmenting phenomena. Second, classical conditioning identifies at least three response-augmenting phenomena through which a fear could arise without the stimulus that is later feared ever being paired with a UCS (higher-order conditioning, sensory preconditioning, and stimulus generalization) and at least six response-moderating phenomena (latent inhibition, extinction, appetitive pairings, UCS habituation, blocking, and overshadowing) which predict that, under certain circumstances, no fear wdl be observable even when an individual has experienced stimulus and traumatic event pairings (see Mackintosh, 1983 , for a comprehensive review). In sum, classical conditioning predicts that current fear to a stimulus will be produced by the combined effects of fear response-augmenting and fear response-moderating events. Despite the fact that classical conditioning theory (and a growing body of research with human subjects, for example, Davey, 1989; White & Davey, 1989; Arcediano, Matute, & Mder, 1997; Hosoba, Iwanaga, & Seiwa, 2000) identifies circumstances that would result in the emergence of a fear where no pairings with trauma have occurred or the failure to develop fears when appropriate trauma pairings have taken place, many have used these concerns to deem classical conditioning inadequate for the study of fear learning. This erroneous claim in the literature on the acquisition of human fear seems to be consistent with a trend in behavior therapy discussed by O'Donohoe (1998) . During the last 30 years an increasing willingness by clinicians and clinical researchers to abandon learning theory conceptualizations of behavior disorders and their treatments may be noted. While it is sometimes stated that learning theory is inadequate to handle complex human problems, O'Donohoe argued that many clinicians are inadequately informed about developments in contemporary learning theory.
In response to his concern that classical conditioning is insufficient to explain the experiential component of fear learning in humans, Rachman proposed (1977 Rachman proposed ( , 1990 ) that classical conditioning constitutes but one of three pathways to the development of acquired fear in humans. H e theorized that, in addition to direct conditioning, human fears also can be built through experiences he calls "indirect," that is, through vicarious or observational learning and through the receipt of verbal information. For example, in the case of a dog phobic, Rachman would hypothesize that this fear could have been built through the individual's having had one or several experiences of (a) trauma in the presence of a dog (conditioning), (b) witnessing another person experience trauma in the presence of a dog (observational learning), or (c) being told that dogs are dangerous or otherwise lead to trauma (learning through the receipt of verbal information). Rachman's ideas have generated considerable research (e.g., Rimm, Janda, Lancaster, Nahl, & Dittmar, 1977; Murray & Foote, 1979; Ost & Hugdahl, 1981 , 1983 , 1985 Kleinknecht, 1982 Kleinknecht, , 1994 Munjack, 1984; McNally & Steketee, 1985; Ost, 1985 Ost, , 1991 Ollendick & King, 1991; Kirkby, Menzies, Daniels, & Smith, 1995; Milgrom, Mancl, King, & Weinstein, 1995) and this literature clearly supports Rachman's three pathways to fear hypothesis.
Rachman's basic idea is valuable, but his model has led to confusion. The experiences he calls indirect are quite comparable to the events he calls conditioning and should be conceptualized as classical conditioning experiences, according to contemporary work in learning theory. It is reasonable to conceptualize these three pathways as capturing classical conditioning processes through different modes rather than as different phenomena. The irnplications of a multimodal classical conditioning reconceptualization for understanding how fears in humans grow and diminish are profound. The study of classical conditioning has produced a wealth of literature on variables that augment or moderate conditioned responses. Many of those variables were mentioned above. A priori to remove observational and verbal learning experiences from the conditioning realm forecloses the study of established conditioning variables in these other modes. In other words, if it is reasonable to conceptualize Rachman's observational and verbal pathways as observational and verbal mode classical conditioning trials, then it is reasonable to explore the fear building role of known response-augmenting variables and the fear ameliorating or preventing role of known response-moderating variables presented in these other modes. Declaring observational and verbal pathways to be something other than classical conditioning discourages clinicians and researchers from exploring known conditioning phenomena in these modes. Considering observational and verbal pathways to be multimodal classical conditioning experiences demands that phenomena known to influence fear conditioning be addressed even when learning takes place through observational or verbal experiences.
Fitting Observational Learning to Classical Conditioning
Rachman posits observational learning as the first of two noncondition-ing pathways to fear. Observational learning experiences like the ones Rachman discusses can be described as observational classical conditioning, or -the learner's observation of another person experiencing a CS-UCS pairing. The idea of conceptualizing such an event as classical conditioning is not new. Several writers (Mineka, Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984; Hogan, 1988; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Mineka & Hamida, 1998) previously have expressed this idea. Mineka, et al. (1984) present data that demonstrate the development of conditioned snake fear responses in rhesus monkeys in a procedure in which observation played a critical role. Monkeys who had no-fear of snakes observed a parent view a snake through a window. Upon viewing the snake, the parent, who previously was fearful of snakes, behaved fearfully. This experience produced fearful behavior in the observing monkeys which was evident in the conditioning situation as well as in other contexts. They expressed fear through avoidance behavior as well as general disturbance behavior,
--and these behaviors were present at 3-mo. follow-up.
Although Mineka, et al. (1984) labeled their procedures as being based on observational classical conditioning, their activities do not perfectly fit the observational classical conditioning paradigm described above. The observing monkeys' eventual fear of the snake is a CR and the snake which elicits the response, a CS. The fearful response of the parent monkeys to the snake is also a CR and the snake which elicits the response, a CS. In Mineka, et al.'s study, the observing monkey sees a snake and sees its parent show fear when it sees the snake. In other words, the observing monkey experiences a pairing of a CS with another organism's CR. While this arrangement of stimuli does not fit the basic classical conditioning model, by appealing to higher-order conditioning, this situation makes conceptual sense. In higher-order conditioning, instead of a UCS, a conditioned stimulus (CSI) which already elicits a conditioned response is paired with a neutral stimulus (CS2). After such pairings, CS2 comes to elicit its own conditioned response. The experience of Mineka's observing monkeys fits the definition of higher-order conditioning. It is reasonable to consider that a parent's fearful behavior is an already established CS for the observing monkey. While the observing monkey is not experiencing a CS-UCS pairing, he is experiencing a CS2-CS1 pairing, which is perfectly consistent with the rules of higher-order classical conditioning.
If observational learning experiences fit the definition of higher-order classical conditioning, then something important is suggested about observational learning experiences. Higher-order conditioning experiences are generally regarded as less effective at building conditioned responses than firstorder conditioning trials in which a UCS is involved. This is the case because every presentation of a CS without the UCS that gave it its condi-tioned value is an extinction trial through which the CS loses a bit of its associative strength (Rescorla, 1980) . When observational experiences are discussed as possible pathways to fear, there is generally no requirement that the fear response of the person observed be previously established as a conditioned stimulus for the learner. Instead, all observational experiences are treated similarly. Whether or not fear responses can be acquired when the observational experience involves another's fearful behavior, which is not already established as a CS for the observer, is not clear. Furthermore, in a later discussion of their study of observational fear learning in monkeys, Mineka and Cook (1993) raise an is--sue that further complicates the picture on observational learning experiences. In that analysis, they make room for the parent monkey's fear reaction to be a UCS for the observer monkey. This conceptualization also appears reasonable and would make their demonstration of observational fear learning another instance of first-order direct classical conditioning.
AU of this suggests that when the label "observational fear learning experiences" is used, we may be capturing a wide range of learning experiences. One subtype of observational learning may be very effective, i.e., those experiences that fit a first-order conditioning model; another subtype may be moderately effective, i.e., those that fit a higher-order conditioning model; the effectiveness of a third subtype, those experiences that involve another's fearful behavior that is not already established as a CS for the observer, or in which the person being observed does not express fear, has not been adequately addressed. Rachman's observational pathway to fear learning blurs the distinctions among these subtypes of experiences. O n the other hand, treating the observational pathway as classical conditioning requires the consideration of potential differences in effectiveness based on the specific nature of the experience.
Fitting "Acquisition by Instruction" to Classical Conditioning
Rachman offered "acquisition by transmission of information and/or instruction" (1977, p. 383) as the second of two nonconditioning pathways to fear. These events can be described as verbal representations of classical conditioning trials. This sort of conceptualization does not appear to be widely accepted by clinical researchers working with fear. However, in the study of emitted behaviors, operant conditioning theorists have recognized that, for humans, operant responses can be acquired through a verbal description of an operant contingency. The literature on rule-governed behavior argues that new emitted behaviors may be acquired simply by the learner being told that he will be reinforced for engaging in that behavior (e.g., Catania, Matthews, & Shimoff, 1990) . This type of event is not regarded as part of a process separate from operant conditioning. Rather, it is regarded as rule-governed behavior or verbally mediated operant conditioning.
Some attempts have been made to conceptualize verbal representations of stimuli in the classical conditioning paradigm. Some (e.g., Razran, 1939; Staats & Staats, 1957; Staats, 1972; Eifert, 1987; Hekmat, 1987) have argued that, through pairings with the real world stimuli they represent, words become conditioned stimuli. In other words, many semantic conditioning theo--rists would argue that one learns that the word "dog" represents the animal we call "dog" because the word "dog" (CS) has been paired with the animal "dog" (UCS). Once established as a CS, the word "dog" can be used effec---tively in higher-order classical conditioning pairings with other real world or verbal stimuli and through such pairings new conditioned responses, including fear responses, can be learned. This argument has led to considerable empirical work. For example, Hugdahl and Ohman (1977) and Hugdahl (1978) demonstrated the establishment of CRs by pairing a real world stimulus with a verbal representation of a UCS. The semantic conditioning argument makes it logical to say that the learning of fear through the receipt of verbal information is verbal classical conditioning. However, if words are conceptualized as CSs, verbal classical conditioning trials are higher-order conditioning trials. Every presentation of a CS without its corresponding UCS is an extinction trial, through which the CS loses a bit of its associative strength (Rescorla, 1980) . This would argue that verbal classical conditioning trials are a weaker means to building CRs than first-order direct conditioning trials.
The real power of words may be more adequately captured by appealing to the work done on stimulus equivalence classes and the application of this concept to language skllls (e.g., Sidman, 197 1; Devany, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986; Sidman, Wynne, Maguire, & Barnes, 1989; Hayes, 1990) . Several studies have demonstrated that humans are capable of learning sets of equivalent stimuli. A subject is said to have established a class of equivalent stimuli, if, for a set of independent stimuli, the subject can match the stimuli in reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and combined symmetry-transitivity relations. A set of stimuli is said to be held in equivalence relations only if some of the relations demonstrated emerged after others were specifically trained. For example, we can imagine, in the course of typical language training, teaching a child to match the spoken word "dog7' (stimulus A) with the animal "dog" (stimulus B) and to match the animal "dog" (stimulus B) with the written word "dog" (stimulus C). Following specific training in these relations, other relations frequently spontaneously emerge. This hypothetical child will likely show that he can work with the stimuli in reflexivity relations, i.e., match A with A, B with B, and C with C, in symmetry relations not specifically trained, i.e., match B with A and C with B, and in transitivity relations, i.e., match A with C and C with A.
Empirical work has demonstrated that conditioned responses establish-ed for one member of an equivalence class readily transfer to another member of the class (e.g., Catania, Horne, & Lowe, 1989; Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfurt, 1994) . In other words, these studies suggest that, if conditioned responding (like fear) becomes established to one member of an equivalence set (like the spoken word "dog"), there will be a response to another member of the equivalence set (like a real dog). Furthermore, if spoken and written words operate in equivalence class relationships with real world stimuli, then once an individual has learned to use and understand words, appropriate pairings of them can function as classical conditioning trials.
Learning through verbal representations appears to be a process no different from direct classical conditioning: conditioning trials are simply verbally represented rather than directly experienced. Forsyth and Eifert (1996a) have suggested that the blending of these two notions, that is, the conceptualization of words as equivalent stimuli with their real world referents and classical conditioning, will explain much in the acquisition of human emotions. It is surprising that the stimulus equivalence view of how words might function in classical conditioning paradigms is not already widely accepted (see also Tierney & Bracken, 1998) . Forsyth and Eifert (1996a) suggest that this might be due to the fact that stimulus equivalence work comes out of the operant conditioning tradition, while work on the conditioning of emotions comes out of the classical conditioning tradition. Each of these lines of inquiry tends to ignore developments in the other. They argue that there are points of intersection between the two traditions and that the conceptualization of words functioning as real world equivalents in classical conditioning trials is likely one of them.
Just as in the case of observational classical conditioning, conceptual issues set some limits on the extent to which verbal CS-UCS pairings will be successful in building new CRs. The stimulus equivalence argument applied to words does not predict that words will always and uniformly function as real world stimuli in conditioning trials. The literature on stimulus equivalence acknowledges that certain contextual conditions need to be met before an established stimulus will enter into equivalence relations. In relational frame theory, Hayes (1990) argued that contextual conditions signal that the equivalency is in operation. Applied to language, this means that spoken and written words will not always be perfect substitutes for their real world counterparts in verbal conditioning trials. The circumstances surrounding the verbal conditioning trials, for example, the trustworthiness of the speaker or the labeling of the verbal event as valid rather than a joke or fiction, would influence the effectiveness of the conditioning trial. This suggests, as with observational classical conditioning, that care must be taken when using verbal classical conditioning trials to predict fear. The context in which the trials take place will likely influence their effectiveness.
From Three Pathways to Multimodal Classical Conditioning
It makes theoretical sense to conceptualize the three pathways to fear as classical conditioning through three different modes. Such a conceptualization is consistent with theoretical and empirical work in conditioning. In addition, general arguments raised in the learning literature support this claim. First, Forsyth and Eifert (199613) and Forsyth, Daleiden, and Chorpita (2000) raised the idea and offered data to support that what is needed for classical conditioning of fear to occur is the occurrence of an alarm response on the part of the learner, whether or not a UCS is identifiable. In other words, if an experience arouses a strong aversive reaction in the learner, classical fear learning should occur. Theoretically, it would seem to matter little if this reaction is aroused through direct, observational, or verbal means. All cases could reasonably be considered classical conditioning. Davey (2002) specifically acknowledges that many experiences are conceptually consistent with conditioning and should be considered as such. More generally, Davey (1987 Davey ( , 1997 argued that a human classical conditioning model must capture the range of human abilities and experiences. The notion that humans can acquire new elicited behaviors through direct, observational, and verbal classical conditioning is consistent with this premise.
None of the discussion above should be taken to mean that for all individuals all three modes of experience will be needed to predict current fear. Conditioning theorists argue that accounts of human behavior need to acknowledge the influence of idiosyncratic experiences in an individual's history on the behavior under study. It remains possible that an individual's fear might be developed through a direct, observational, or verbal mode alone, or through the combination of two of the three. Furthermore, it is likely that, as subgroups of subjects share life experiences or learning styles, their fear learning might be characterized by particular combinations of modes. Nevertheless, bringing a multimodal classical conditioning approach to the study of fear directs the investigator to consider all three modes. Fear prediction across subjects will certainly be enhanced if data are collected on all three modes.
Implications of Multimodal Classical Conditioning for Fear Acquisition Histories
This proposed reconceptualization of the experience-based development of human fear is more than semantic. Studies exploring Rachman's three pathways model followed a particular style of data collection. Had these been based on a multimodal classical conditioning model, data would have been collected differently. Because classical conditioning predicts that fear will grow with repeated experience with response-augmenting phenomena, researchers would have measured current fear in their subjects, instead of the more typical labeling of subjects as fearful or not. In addition, researchers would have routinely collected information on the number of experiences in a pathway, instead of simply calling a pathway present or absent in a subject's history. Finally, following this reconceptualization, researchers would have routinely considered experiences in all three modes as potential contributors to fear instead of categorizing subjects by a single pathway of fear acquisition as is typically done. In fact, some three pathways researchers who broke from the area's data-collection style found interesting results. 01-lendick and King (1991), in a study of a variety of fears in children, found that the correlation between intensity of fear and source of learning was consistently higher for combined sources than for direct conditioning, observational learning, or verbal learning alone. Similarly, Milgrom, et al. (1995) ) in a study of dental fears of children, found that prediction of fear was improved by including indices of both direct and observational conditioning.
Consistent with the preceding discussion, a preliminary investigation was undertaken. Data typical of that used in research on the three pathways model, but collected in a manner consistent with multimodal classical conditioning of fear were analyzed. It was hypothesized that the relative number of direct, observational, and verbal classical conditioning experiences will predict current intensity of fear. In addition, it was predicted that, if reduced to necessary and sufficient components, prediction models would comprise different conditioning variables for different subject groups.
Two samples of subjects were recruited. Sample 1 ( n = 107) comprised 25 male subjects, 77 female subjects, and 5 subjects who did not indicate sex group, who attended a small, private, urban university. They ranged in age from 18 to 61 years, with a mean age of 29.8. Reported ethnicity was 68.2 % Euro-American , 14.0 % African American, 6.5 % Asian American, and 5.6% Hispanic (5.6% indicated "other"). Sample 2 (n -207) comprised 145 male subjects and 62 female subjects who were recruited from the Introductory Psychology Subject Pool at a large state university. They ranged in age from 18 to 26 years, with a mean age of 19.2. Reported ethnicity was 84.5 % Euro-American, 4.9 % African American, 3.9 % Asian American, and 2.9% Hispanic (3.9% indicated "other"). This project was approved by the institutional review boards at both universities. All participants signed consent forms indicating that they understood the description of the study and agreed to participate.
Materials
This investigation required measures that would probe for the mode and number of fear-relevant conditioning experiences an individual has had across his life. Furthermore, it was desirable to investigate a broad variety of fears. For these reasons, fear history questionnaires were built using the Fear Survey Schedule Version I11 (FSS-111) as a model. The FSS-I11 was also used to assess participants' current intensity of fear. O n the Fear Survey Schedule, Version I11 (FSS-111) (Wolpe & Lang, 1964 ) subjects respond to 76 stimulus prompts on the basis of the following text: "The items in this questionnaire refer to things and experiences that may cause fear or other unpleasant feelings. Check the space that describes how much you are disturbed by each these days."
For the Fear History Schedule (FHS), the instructions were modified to enquire about direct, observational, and verbal experiences as follows:
Direct Experience (FHS-Direct).-"Please use the scale below to describe how often, throughout your lifetime, you have experienced danger, pain, or other problems after encountering any of these items listed below."
Observational Experience (FHS-Observational).-"Please use the scale below to describe how often, throughout your lifetime, you have seen others experience dangerous or painful events, or other problems when they encountered any of the items listed below. Please base your response on events you have seen in real life, movies, television, or in stories you have read."
Verbal Experience (FHS-Verbal) .-"Please use the scale below to describe how often, throughout your lifetime, yolr have been told that any of the items listed below will lead to danger or problems for you."
For the FSS and Fear History Schedules, participants used a >-point scale to code an answer to each question: 1 =never, 2 =sometimes, 3 = a fair amount, 4 = often, 5 = very often.
Procedure
For Sample 1, a psychology graduate student who was a research assistant met each participating class and invited students to participate in a questionnaire study of experiences with fear. Students who signed consent forms were each handed a numbered questionnaire packet and were given class time to complete the packets. The packets contained the FSS-111, FHSDirect, FHS-Observational, and FHS-Verbal and a set of demographic questions. The demographic questions always appeared first, with the other questionnaires following in random order. The assistant visited each participating class again 2 wk. following the first administration and distributed packets to participants who had signed consent forms. Class time was allowed for the completion of questionnaires.
For Sample 2, participants who signed consent forms attended one of several data collection meetings. A research assistant distributed questionnaire packets and allowed time for their completion. These packets contained seven questionnaires including the five presented to Sample 1. In this case, the demographic questions always appeared first, followed by the FSS-111, and then the Fear History Schedules in random order. RESULTS An analysis of the test-retest reliability of the three new schedules (FHS-Direct, FHS-Observational and FHS-Verbal) was conducted with test periods 2 wk. apart with participants in Sample 1. Sixty-six participants were available on the second testing occasion. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated between scores from the first and second assessment occasions for each scale. Because there was little meaning, for the purposes of this study, in overall fear scores, reliability was assessed on the basis of responses to each of the 76 fear stimuli. The median test-retest correlations across the 76 fear stimuli for each scale were as follows: FHS-Direct, .55 (range was .19 to .78), FHS-Observational, .46 (range was .24 to .63) and FHS-Verbal, .53 (range was .2O to .77) . These values are lower than the test-retest coefficients reported for the FSS-I11 in the literature; however, those coefficients were based on full-scale fear scores which would be predicted to be higher than median values of single-item correlations. For this reason, the test-retest reliability of the Fear Survey Schedule based on median values of single-item correlations was also calculated. The median test-retest correlation for items on the Fear Survey Schedule was .52, with a range of .17 to 37. For a sample of this size, the critical value for significance at the .05 level is 21. This fact, and the fact that the three new scales behaved similarly to the Fear Survey Schedule-I11 in terms of test-retest reliability, were taken to indicate that the three Fear History Schedules performed reliably over time.
Fear and History Distributions
The response distributions for all scales indicated that a full range of fear intensities were evidenced with only a few items, i.e., crossing streets, journeys by train, imaginary creatures, people with deformities, noise of vacuum cleaners, and worms, exhibiting attenuated distributions.
A 2 (samples) x 2 (sexes) x 4 (forms) repeated-measures analysis of variance was used to investigate the item means of the 76 stimuli. A strong main effect for form (F,.,,, = 136 .5 1, p < .00001) indicated that participants reported a higher frequency of observational conditioning than direct and verbal conditioning or fear itself. Although there were interactions, they did not contradict the main effect for form. Follow-up analyses on each form compared samples and sexes. The largest effect was for sex on the Fear Survey Schedule, with men reporting .21 units less fear than women. On each of the Fear History Schedules there was a sex or sex by sample difference, but of lower magnitude.
Prediction of Fear from Direct, Observational, and Verbal Conditioning
For each sample, separately, multiple regression analyses were conducted on each of the 76 fear stimuli to evaluate whether current intensity of fear could be predicted from the direct, observational, and verbal modes of conditioning. The following decision rules for testing prediction models were adopted: A model including the conditioning modes, sex, and each of the sex by mode interactions was tested. If any of the interactions with sex were significant, then analyses were run separately for each sex group within that sample. If none of the interactions were significant, then the analysis was rerun, excluding the interaction terms but retaining sex as a predictor. Beyond the concern for sex as a confounding variable, the most efficient prediction model for each fear for each sample was sought. Model determination proceeded by backward elimination, retaining only those variables needed to maintain significance ( p < .05).
The report of the results of the multiple regression analyses is organized around the study's two hypotheses.
The relative number of direct, obseruational, and verbal respondent conditioning experiences will predict current intensity of fear.-The analyses described above successfully predicted 67 of the 76 fears for both sex groups of both samples. The remaining nine fears were also predictable, but only for specific samples or sample by sex groups. For eight of these nine fears, prediction was possible for three sample by sex groups and, for the other fear, prediction was possible for two of the sample by sex groups. The strategy used to identify multiple regression models for 76 fears for two sex groups in each of two samples could yield as few as 152 models (76 fears for each of the two samples) or as many as 304 models (76 fears for each sex in each sample). The actual number of resulting models was 21 1, arising from the need for 59 sex-group specific models. For 201 of these 211 models, prediction was statistically significant; 174 were significant ( p 2 .001). For these 201 significant prediction models, the mean adjusted R2 was .29, ranging from .03 to .76.
As mentioned above, in only 10 of the 211 models (involving nine fears) was the prediction not statistically significant. The failures to predict fear were associated with small sample sizes, i.e., there were only 25 men in Sample 1, attenuated distributions for the predictors or criterion, or both.
For most stimuli, fear is significantly associated with each of the three conditioning modalities, although the range is quite varied, as shown in Fig.  1 . Looking at individual univariate predictors, fear is most strongly correlated with direct conditioning and relates about equally to observational and The multiple regression models show a slightly different picture. Table  1 shows the number of times each combination of predictors was required, the mean adjusted R2, and the mean standardized beta weights for the conditioning variables in the model. Most notably, direct conditioning enters into the largest number of models and has the highest mean beta weight. Conversely, observational conditioning enters into the least number of models and also has the lowest mean beta weight. Chi square and log-linear analyses of the frequency of joint occurrence of predictors in the 21 1 regression models indicated that the inclusion of predictors was not simply a function of the base rate occurrence of each predictor ( x ,~ = 2 1 .OO, p < .0003). In particular, the occurrence of direct and verbal conditioning as predictors in the models were not independent of one another (xI2 = 16.60, p < .00005), but the occurrence of observational conditioning was independent of both direct and verbal conditioning, individually and jointly ( p > .05 for each comparison). The relationship between direct and verbal conditioning was such that, if one was included, the other was llkely to not be included (4 = -.28). However, knowing whether direct, verbal, or both direct and verbal conditioning were included in a regression model provided no information about whether observational conditioning was included.
In summary, fear was predicted from direct, observational, and verbal conditioning, however the conditioning variables certainly performed differently in terms of predicting fear. Specifically, the majority of prediction models involved direct conditioning: 36% required only direct experience as a predictor and another 44% required direct conditioning in combination with other predictors. Also, across the fear models, the inclusion of observational conditioning appeared to be independent of direct and verbal conditioning; however, for fears where direct conditioning was needed in the prediction model, verbal conditioning was not required (and vice versa) .
If reduced to necessary and suflicient components, prediction models would comprise d$ferent conditioning variables for different groups of subjects.-It is reasonable to expect that fear would be best predicted for a diverse group of subjects by simultaneously considering all three conditioning modes. Although learning is quite idiosyncratic, it is reasonable to expect that, as subject groups become less diverse, fewer variables might be needed in the prediction of fear. For this reason, it was expected that specifically defined subject subgroups would produce fear prediction models with fewer conditioning variables and that these conditioning variables would reflect the subgroup's characteristic "style" in learning fears. To explore this, chi square analyses of the distribution of models by sex groups (males, females, and combined) and sample (one or two) were conducted. The only significant relationship (~,'=46.56, p < .OO001) found was between sex group and the direct and verbal conditioning combination. This relationship showed that the models for male subjects were different from the models for female subjects or for male and female subjects combined. Details of these differences were investigated by comparing the proportion of times verbal and direct conditioning occurred in the models for the three sex groups. For males com-pared to females or both sexes combined, there were more models that had verbal conditioning alone, more models that had neither direct nor verbal conditioning, and fewer models that had direct conditioning alone or both direct and verbal conditioning. For females and both sexes combined compared to males, there were fewer models that had verbal conditioning alone or neither direct nor verbal conditioning. For females compared to both sexes combined, there were more models that had direct conditioning alone and fewer models that had both direct and verbal conditioning.
DISCUSSION
The results of the data analyses support the hypothesis that the relative number of direct, observational, and verbal respondent conditioning experiences predict current fear level. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that all three conditioning modes need to be considered to maximize the prediction of fear across subjects; however, for specific fears and subject characteristics, all three modalities may not be needed. The results support the hypothesis that, if reduced to necessary and sufficient components, prediction models would comprise different conditioning variables for different subject groups.
The results also yielded some curiosities regarding the performance of the three modes. Observational conditioning alone was required in only three of the 21 1 prediction models. This is surprising in light of the fact that the relative frequencies of direct conditioning alone and verbal conditioning alone predict fear in many more models, 76 and 21, respectively. Observational experiences do a far weaker job of predicting fear than either direct or verbal conditioning experiences, even though mean levels of observational conditioning were higher than mean levels of direct and verbal conditioning. An explanation may be found in the earlier discussion of observational classical conditioning. Observational conditioning, at least under certain circumstances, is best conceptualized as higher-order direct conditioning. Higherorder conditioning experiences are always potentially weaker forms of training because of the extinction trials embedded within them.
A second curiosity is found in the performance of the verbal mode. In this study's attempt to conceptualize verbal experiences as classical conditioning events, literature was cited in which words were considered to be conditioned stimuli for their real world referents. If this is the case, then verbal conditioning trials are higher-order conditioning trials and should perform much like observational conditioning trials in prediction models. Yet, verbal conditioning performed far better than observational conditioning. This finding is logical if the conceptualization of words as conditioned stimuli is in error, and the alternative conceptualization discussed above, that words are equivalent stimuli to their real world referents, is correct. In other words, if the stimulus equivalence argument applies to words, then they are interchangeable for their physical world counterparts in conditioning trials. This would lead to a prediction that conditioning trials involving words would yield results comparable to conditioning trials involving real world stimuli.
While verbal conditioning was necessary as a predictor more frequently than observational conditioning, it was necessary far less often than direct conditioning. It might be argued that this finding makes a stimulus equivalence explanation untenable. As discussed above, however, the literature on stimulus equivalence (e.g., Hayes, 1990) acknowledges that certain contextual conditions need to be met before a stimulus wdl enter into established equivalence relations. These contextual conditions signal that the equivalency is in operation. Applied to language, this might mean that the conditions surrounding the verbal conditioning trials, for example, the trustworthiness of the speaker, would influence the effectiveness of the conditioning trial. The assessment of verbal conditioning used in this study asked subjects to describe the relative frequency of verbal conditioning irrespective of contextual cues that would signal the "equivalence" of those words with real world events. Subjects' responses to the verbal experience questions may well have reflected trustworthy and worthless pairings of verbal stimuli and predictions of danger. This could have led to the poorer prediction of fear by verbal conditioning, relative to direct conditioning, seen in this study.
The results also suggest that subjects' sex influenced the nature of the prediction model that was necessary to predict fear. Given that direct experience alone was more likely a predictorfor female subjects and verbal experience alone was more likely a predictor for male subjects, one wonders if direct classical conditioning trials are better "fear teachers" for women and verbal conditioning trials are better "fear teachers" for men. Interestingly, Ollendick and King (1991) reported correlations between fear and verbal conditioning that were significantly higher for boys than girls, while fear and direct conditioning were equivalently correlated in both sex groups.
Some speculation on this topic seems in order. Social lore and some research (see Wright, 1998) suggest that men are more physically active and hence have more experience with the physical environment than women, and that women engage in more verbal interactions than men. O n initial consideration, these proposed background differences in men versus women might lead one to label the observed differences in model frequencies as counterintuitive. However, if this notion is correct, and men do have more experiences in the physical environment than do women, other things may follow. Such experiences could well make specific physical stimuli less salient or noticeable for men than for women. The less salient a stimulus is, the less likely it is to elicit conditioned responses after classical conditioning pairings with an unconditioned stimulus (see Mackintosh, 1983) . Conversely, if physical stimuli are more salient for women than for men, one would expect that conditioning with physical stimuli would be more effective for women than for men. A parallel argument follows for verbal experiences: If women are more likely than men to have experience with verbal stimuli, then one would expect specific verbal stimuli to be less salient for women than they are for men.
Alternatively, some have suggested that women use verbal communication to serve both affiliative and informational functions, while men are more likely to use verbal communication to serve informational functions (see Clark, 1998) . This may mean that women learn a broader set of contextual cues regarding what a particular communication means and may be more ready to disregard some verbal communications while men may be less discriminating.
The empirical work presented in this paper is a preliminary attempt to demonstrate the use of a multimodal classical conditioning view of fear acquisition. In this study, fear was clearly predictable from various combinations of direct, observational, and verbal conditioning histories. Men and women appear to have acquired some of their fears through different modes. The data demonstrate how previous fear studies, inspired by Rachman's model, would have been conducted differently had they used a multimodal classical conditioning conceptualization.
The predictability uncovered in this study may well identify only a portion of the prediction a multimodal classical conditioning account of fear could provide. As was discussed earlier, the classical conditioning literature has identified many factors that influence the success of conditioning. Current learned fear to a stimulus is predicted by the combined effects of a variety of fear response-augmenting and fear response-moderating phenomena.
Research on learned human fear should be designed to consider the contributions of all known conditioning events to current fear. This study suggests that manifestations of those known conditioning events be considered in direct, observational, and verbal modes.
In addition to furthering the field's understanding of the development of human fear, this reconceptualization has considerable clinical implications. First, the model has implications for prevention. Classical conditioning suggests that certain experiences, e.g., latent inhibition, can leave individuals protected from the later development of problematic conditioned fear responses. If these safeguarding experiences can be as effectively delivered through observational and verbal modes as through direct modes, then opportunities to foster resilience grow. Second, the model has treatment irnplications. A multimodal classical conditioning perspective encourages a clinician to ask which mode is most responsible for a client's fear and raises the empirical question of whether fitting the mode of treatment to the mode of acquisition will facilitate improvement.
